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The Podium Mechanism: Improving on the Laplace
and Staircase Mechanisms
Vasyl Pihur
Abstract—The Podium mechanism guarantees (, 0)-
differential privacy by sampling noise from a finite mixture of
three uniform distributions. By carefully constructing such a
mixture distribution, we trivially guarantee privacy properties,
while minimizing the variance of the noise added to our
continuous outcome. Our gains in variance control are due to
the “truncated” nature of the Podium mechanism where support
for the noise distribution is maintained as close as possible to
the sensitivity of our data collection, unlike the infinite support
that characterizes both the Laplace and Staircase mechanisms.
In a high-privacy regime ( < 1), the Podium mechanism
outperforms the other two by 50-70% in terms of the noise
variance reduction, while in a low privacy regime ( → ∞), it
asymptotically approaches the Staircase mechanism.
Index Terms—Data Privacy, randomized algorithm.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the introduction of differential privacy [1], the Laplace
mechanism [1] became de facto a standard way of ensuring
that the differential privacy property is satisfied when collect-
ing or releasing continuous outcomes. In fact, to many casual
privacy practitioners, the notions of differential privacy and
the Laplace mechanism have become two sides of the same
coin, one a theoretical and somewhat vague concept, while the
second a practical and prescriptive way of achieving it.
In the privacy literature, the primary focus is always on
privacy. This, however, frequently happens at the unjustified
expense of utility. We often seem to forget that the goal is to
collect and use data in the most privacy-preserving manner
possible, while still enabling data analyses and inferences
necessary to run our businesses, governments and enterprises.
If there exist two randomized algorithms providing exactly the
same privacy guarantees, then the one with the better utility
should be used.
The Staircase mechanism [2], for example, has been explic-
itly constructed to maximize utility and is strictly better than
the Laplace mechanism, yet it has not been widely adopted.
One could argue that it is somewhat complex to implement and
more computationally expensive than the Laplace mechanism.
These are true, but it seems that we, as a privacy research
community, simply are not as passionate about data utility, as
we are about privacy. We seem to have forgotten that we want
to learn with privacy and not to just make a privacy claim.
In this work, we propose the Podium mechanism, a novel
randomized algorithm to achieve -differential privacy. The
scope of this work is most relevant to the local privacy model
(LDP) where multiple noise additions accumulate through the
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collection process, so we limit our discussion to this setting.
However, the Podium mechanism can be used in place of the
Laplace or the Staircase mechanisms in all settings and will
result in more precise estimates (smaller variance) in all cases.
It is also important to point out that we are dealing
solely with continuous or numeric outcomes, so randomized
algorithms designed for the discrete case are not strictly
relevant [3], [4], though one can always discretize a continuous
outcome with a loss in precision.
While we will formally introduce the Laplace and Staircase
mechanisms in the following section, the critical piece that is
relevant for this discussion is that both mechanisms generate
noise from distributions with an infinite support, i.e. add noise
values sampled from the whole real line. If one is collecting
age using the Laplace mechanism in the LDP setting, say
between 1 and 120 years, it is possible to record 200, 300 or
even 10,001. It is also almost guaranteed to record negative
age values. This is clearly not great from the utility standpoint,
though it appears to be absolutely necessary for privacy
reasons.
We can ask ourselves two important questions. First, can
we generate noise from a distribute with a finite support and
still guarantee -differential privacy? Second, can we generate
noise in such a manner that the input and output ranges
are the same? If we are collecting age in [1, 120], can we
output noisy values in [1, 120] as well and still guarantee
-differential privacy? In this work, we affirmatively answer
the first question through the Podium mechanism. The second
question remains open, though the Podium mechanism does
have a well-defined output range and is designed to keep the
input and output ranges as close as possible.
We can make an arbitrary distribution assume a finite
support by truncating its tails. For example, we could truncated
the tails of the Laplace distribution at -3 and 3 and adjust by
a constant factor to make it a proper distribution function.
This distribution would clearly have smaller variance and
would eliminate the possibility of extreme outliers. In doing
so, however, we would lose all privacy properties: centered
at two different input values, we would be left with output
regions covered by only one of the two noise distributions.
There have been recent successes [5] in using the truncated
Laplace distribution, but they provide (, δ)-differential privacy
guarantees, essentially capturing the single coverage regions
with δ.
Perhaps, we could use the usual Laplace distribution and
truncate the output values (after noise addition) to a fixed,
finite range. In this case, we clearly would maintain our
privacy properties as any function of the output, in this case
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truncation, would continue to maintain -differential privacy
guarantees. However, we would lose utility, mainly in terms
of introducing bias, as the noise would no longer be centered
at the input values. To see this more clearly, imagine that we
are collecting an outcome in [-3, 3] and truncate our output to
[-3, 3] as well. By the luck of the draw, our sample happens to
be all 3’s. Our estimate of the mean would be always smaller
than 3, no matter how much data we would collect. Even
more unfortunately, the introduced bias would be a function
of  itself.
The Podium mechanism solves this dilemma of having to
choose either privacy or utility. It provides -differential pri-
vacy guarantees by generating noise from a family of Podium
distributions. They all have the same finite support for privacy
reasons and adjust their shape, from left to right, to avoid
introducing bias for utility reasons. There was no clear way to
accomplish this by generating noise from a single truncated
distribution, but it becomes possible when this restriction is
relaxed.
The Podium mechanism has the following properties:
1) It samples from a “truncated” distribution, meaning its
support is not the entire real line, but matches the
sensitivity ∆ as closely as possible.
2) The shape of the distribution changes depending on the
input value x to ensure that the noise distribution is
centered properly.
3) It significantly outperforms both the Laplace and Stair-
case mechanisms in terms of noise variance even in a
high-privacy regime.
In the next section, we will go over the necessary back-
ground information, formalizing the key concepts mentioned
in the Introduction. In section 3, we will derive the Podium
mechanism. Section 4 will describe how to generate noise
values using the Podium mechanism. Privacy and utility con-
siderations will be discussed in Sections 5 and 6, respectively.
Section 7 will provide empirical results and comparisons with
the Laplace and Staircase mechanisms.
II. BACKGROUND
Formally, let X be a continuous random variable to be
collected in a local privacy model [6], [4], given a privacy
budget of . LetM be a randomized mechanism [7] that adds
zero-mean noise with variance σ2 to each raw data point x.
Let x′ =M(x) be the observed, noisy data points satisfying
the -differential privacy property.
Definition 1: (-differential privacy). A randomized mecha-
nism M satisfies -differential privacy if for all inputs xi and
xj and all outputs x′,
P (M(xi) = x′) ≤ eP (M(xj) = x′).
The noise variance σ2 is a function of the privacy budget 
and the sensitivity of the data collection ∆.
Definition 2: (Global Sensitivity). Sensitivity of the data
collection, ∆, is defined a priori to the data collection as
∆ = max
xi,xj
||xi − xj ||1.
For a one-dimensional case, this is simply a true range R(X)
(or support) of the random variable X , defined as
R(X) = max(X)−min(X).
The Laplace Mechanism is being widely used in practice to
ensure -differential privacy property, mainly due to the ease
with which a specific Laplace distribution can be chosen given
sensitivity ∆ and the budget . It is also trivial to generate
random variables from the Laplace distribution by taking the
natural log of a scaled uniform random variable with a random
sign.
Definition 3: (Laplace Mechanism). The Laplace Mecha-
nism (LM) ensures -differential privacy by adding noise from
the Laplace distribution with mean 0 and scale b = ∆ such
that
x′ = x+ L
(
0,
∆

)
= L
(
x,
∆

)
,
where L is a random variable with a probability density
function
f(z;µ, b) =
1
2b
e−
|z−µ|
b ,∀z ∈ R.
The Staircase mechanism [2] was derived an an alternative
to the Laplace mechanism where the functional form of the
distribution was optimized to minimize the variance of the
noise. The optimal shape of the distribution, appropriately
named the Staircase distribution, is a piece-wise discontinuous
step function, tapering off geometrically on both sides.
Definition 4: (Staircase Mechanism). To ensure -
differential privacy, the Staircase mechanism (SM) [2], [8],
[9] samples from a geometric mixture of uniform random
variables with the probability density function f(z; γ) defined
as
f(z; γ) =

a(γ) z ∈ [0, γ∆)
e−a(γ) z ∈ [γ∆,∆)
e−kfγ(z − k∆) z ∈ [k∆, (k + 1)∆)
fγ(−z) z < 0
where
a(γ) =
1− e−
2∆(γ + e−(1− γ))
and
γ = − e
−
1− e− +
(e− − 2e−2 + 2e−4 − e−5)1/3
21/3(1− e−)2 .
Visual comparison between the Laplace and Staircase mech-
anisms in low-privacy regimes (in this case  = 0.5) is
shown in Figure 1. The two densities overlap to a large
degree, which points to one of the main reasons why the
Laplace mechanism is still being widely used. The Staircase
mechanism begins to have smaller variance only for larger ’s.
In addition, it is also harder to generate random variables from
the Staircase distribution (three uniform and one Geometric
random variables) and some algebra needs to be done to
compute γ. This certainly adds to the complexity of the noise
generation.
The Staircase mechanism was derived to minimize either
the `1 or `2 loss functions and is optimal in a sense that
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Fig. 1. Comparison of the Laplace and Staircase noise distributions for ∆ = 1
and  = 0.5. In a low privacy regime, the Staircase mechanism is essentially
a “discrete” approximation of the Laplace distribution. Its efficiency benefits
become apparent only for larger ’s.
it generates noise with the smallest possible variance when
optimized for `2. The reason why further gains in variance
reduction can be made is that the authors of the Staircase
mechanism made an implicit assumption of optimizing for
a single functional form. The Staircase mechanism generates
noise from the same distribution regardless of whether the
noise is added to −∆2 , 0 or ∆10 .
Relative efficiency is commonly used to compare two un-
biased estimators. This is a standard way of comparing two
estimators in the statistics literature and, whenever presented
with two unbiased estimators for a quantity µ, one would
obviously prefer one with smaller variance.
Definition 5: (Relative Efficiency). The relative effi-
ciency [10] of two estimators of an unknown parameter µ,
T1 and T2 is defined as
e(T1, T2) =
V (T1)
V (T2)
,
where V (·) is the variance of the estimator defined as
V (T1) = E[(T1 − µ)2],
where E(·) is the expectation operator.
III. THE PODIUM MECHANISM
The Podium distribution is a two-step function (therefore,
looks like a podium) where the height of the step is determined
by the privacy parameter , the width of the step is determined
by minimizing the variance of the distribution and its location
is dictated by the input value x or its mean. Figure 2 shows
four such distributions for different values of x.
We assume that the input values x are shifted to the
range [−∆/2,∆/2]. Besides knowing the sensitivity ∆, the
knowledge of the minimum value of X is required. The
transformation for the location shift becomes
x− [min(X) + ∆/2].
A. Parameterization of the Podium distribution
Besides  and ∆ (which are given), the Podium distribution
is described by three additional parameters m, w and t.
The first one, m, is a multiplicative margin on ∆ describing
the support of the distribution. We would like to have the
smallest possible m (i.e. m = 1) which would allow us to
match the range of input and output values. Note that both
the Laplace and Staircase mechanisms generate values on the
whole real line, leading to the loss of efficiency due to the
possibility of extreme outliers. However, m cannot possibly
be 1 because adding noise centered at the extreme values
of either −∆/2 or ∆/2 would require mean to be equal to
min or max, which is not possible for any non-degenerate
distribution. Therefore, m must be larger than 1, extending
the support of the noise distribution in both directions. The
margin m depends only on  and is determined by minimizing
the variance of the Podium distribution centered at ∆/2.
The second parameter w describes the width of the step. Its
value also comes from the variance optimization. It depends on
 and ∆ and can be pre-computed once before the collection
begins.
The third parameter t describes the location of the step un-
der the constraint that the mean (µ) of the Podium distribution
is equal the input value x. This parameter ranges between
−∆m/2 and ∆m/2. Since it changes depending on x, it
must be computed every time during the collection process. To
avoid performing a constrained optimization, we parameterize
t using another unconstrained parameter s as
t =
∆m
1 + e−s
− ∆m
2
,
which translates a real value s into an interval
[−∆m/2,∆m/2].
B. Deriving the Podium distribution
To derive the shape of the Podium distribution, we would
like to minimize its variance. We are presented with a choice
here as the shape and variance of the distribution changes,
depending on its mean. It makes sense to perform such
minimization under the constraint that its mean is equal to
∆/2 or at its most extreme shape. It is there that we are forced
to allocate a margin m to balance the distribution. It is also a
shape where the second parameter w becomes a function of t,
as the distribution becomes a mixture of two uniform variables
instead of three. This distribution is shown schematically in
Figure 3.
We will perform variance optimization calculations at the
extreme right shape of the Podium distribution. We have two
unknowns (m and s) and two constraints. The first one is that
µ = ∆/2 and the second one is that the area under the Podium
function should add up to one to be a proper distribution.
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Fig. 2. Podium mechanism for ∆ = 1 and  = log(9) for different input values x (different means). The step shifts from left (−∆m/2) to right (∆m/2)
taking on different shapes for values in between. The shaded region highlights the range of input values. The support of the distribution is defined by the
margin m and sensitivity ∆. In this case m = 2.102601 and the width w = 0.7540498.
Because it is a two-component mixture distribution with
mean µ, its variance can be computed [11] as
V (Z) = E[(Z − µ)2]
=
2∑
i=1
pi(µ
2
i + σ
2
i )− µ2
= p(µ21 + σ
2
1) + (1− p)(µ22 + σ22)− (∆/2)2,
where p is the proportion of the first component, µ1 and µ2
are the means of each component and σ21 and σ
2
2 are their
corresponding variances.
First, we compute the probability of the first component p
which turns out to be a function of  and s only. Let d be the
density (height) of the first component. Let the height of the
second component be de (refer to Figure 3).
Then, the probability of the first component is equal to
p =
(
∆m
1 + e−s
− ∆m
2
+
∆m
2
)
d =
∆md
1 + e−s
.
Similarly after some algebra,
1− p = ∆mde

1 + es
.
Because these must add up to 1 to produce a proper density
function, we can solve for d which is equal to
d =
(1 + e−s)(1 + es)
∆m(1 + es + e + e−s)
.
Plugging d into the first component probability gives
p =
1 + es
1 + es + e + e−s
,
which does not depend on m or ∆.
Since each component is simply a uniform random variable
on an interval [a, b], its mean is given by a+b2 and variance by
(b−a)2
12 . Thus, the mean of the first component is given by
µ1 = −∆m
2
(
1
1 + es
)
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Fig. 3. Podium distribution at its extreme right shape with the mean equal
to ∆/2. It is a mixture of two uniform random variables, parameterized by
m and t, or alternatively m and s, in addition to ∆ and . Notice that w
becomes redundant in the most extreme form (w = ∆m
2
− t).
and the mean of the second component by
µ2 =
∆m
2
(
1
1 + e−s
)
.
Their variances, of course, are simply
σ21 =
∆2m2
12
(
1
1 + e−s
)2
and
σ22 =
∆2m2
12
(
1
1 + es
)2
,
respectively.
We now consider our second constraint that the mean of
this distribution is equal to ∆/2 which implies that
µ = pµ1 + (1− p)µ2
= − ∆m
2(1 + es + e + e−s)
+
∆me
2(1 + es + e + e−s)
=
∆
2
This allows us to solve for m which can be expressed as
m =
1 + es + e + e−s
e − 1 .
At this point, everything is expressed in terms of , ∆ and
s. Plugging individual pieces into the total variance formula
above, after combining and rearranging terms, we get
V (Z) =
∆2
12
(1 + es + e + e−s)(3 + e−s + es(es + 3e))
(e − 1)2(1 + es)
−∆
2
4
.
Taking the first derivative of V (Z) with respect to s gives
dV (Z)
ds
= −2e−s + 2es+ − e2−2s + e2s,
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Fig. 4. /3 is a good approximation of s and can be used in place of the
quartic roots. This approximation affects only the relative efficiency of the
Podium mechanism and does not change its privacy guarantees.
which is a quartic function (4th-degree polynomial) in s.
Setting dV (Z)ds equal to 0 and solving for s, we get
s =
log
(
−√A+e2−e+√−B+2e2−A
2
)
 ≥ log(√2)
log
(√
A+e2−e+√B+2e2−A
2
)
 < log(
√
2)
(1)
where
A = (4(e2 − e4))1/3
and
B =
2(2e − e3)√
A+ e2
.
The second derivative is given by
d2V (Z)
ds2
= 4e(cosh(2s− ) + cosh(s))
and is always positive as the domain of cosh(x) is ≥ 1. Thus,
our solution represents a true global minimum.
For taking derivatives and for many other algebraic compu-
tations in this work, we used WolframAlpha’s symbolic math
calculator, so no intermediate algebra steps are available.
These expressions for s look daunting at first, as are all real
solutions to quartic equations. We plotted  vs s in Figure 4
and it is apparent that their relationship can be quite closely
approximated by a linear function! In fact, s = /3 is a very
good approximation for the above equations. It is important to
keep in mind that this approximation for s does not effect the
privacy of the Podium mechanism. It only affects its relative
efficiency and, as we will demonstrate later, not by much at
all.
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 14, NO. 8, AUGUST 2015 6
Our width parameter w can now be computed as
w =
∆m
2
− t
=
∆m
2
−
(
∆m
1 + e−s
− ∆m
2
)
= ∆m
(
1− 1
1 + e−s
)
=
∆m
1 + es
.
Both m and s are agnostic to the sensitivity ∆, while w is
linearly proportional to it.
IV. SAMPLING FROM THE PODIUM DISTRIBUTION
To generate a random variable from the Podium distribution
given the collection parameters  and ∆, one can pre-compute
m, w and d using Algorithm 1. This can be done once prior to
the start of the collection process. One has two choices with
respect to this step, depending on how “optimal” one would
like to be, either EXACT or APPROXIMATE. If one chooses
the EXACT value for s, then one must use the quartic solutions
(they are pre-computed for a range of  values in Table I along
with the rest of the parameters. If one is comfortable with a
slight loss in efficiency, then setting s = /3 and computing
m, w and d as in Algorithm 1 is necessary.
Algorithm 1 Offline algorithm for computing the extreme
right form of the Podium distribution. One has a choice of
computing s either exactly or approximately. This step needs
to be performed only once prior to the collection process. If
the desired value of  can be found in Table I, then one can
find the output of this algorithm there.
1: Input: , ∆
2: if EXACT then
3: Compute s according to (1) or look it up in Table I
4: else
5: Compute s = /3
6: end if
7: Compute m = 1+e
s+e+e−s
e−1
8: Compute w = ∆m1+es
9: Compute d = (1+e
−s)(1+es)
∆m(1+es+e+e−s)
10: Output: m, w and d
To add the Podium noise during the actual collection, one
must perform Algorithm 2 on every noise addition, since the
shape of the distribution depends on the input value x. The
only shape parameter that changes is t, the location of the
step. After computing t, we simply pick at random one of the
three mixture components (by generating a standard uniform
random variable) and then randomly pick from the selected
component with the help of another uniform random variable.
In Table I, we pre-computed d, w, m and s for a wide
variety of ’s. This table is meant to be used as a lookup table
for the shape of the distribution by practitioners in cases when
they do not want to bother with the messy quartic solutions.
We range  from 0.1 to 10 and show d∆, w/∆, m and s with
great precision of up to 20 digits.
Algorithm 2 Online algorithm for generating a random vari-
able from the Podium distribution with mean µ = x. This
algorithm needs to be performed on every noise addition. It
requires generation of two uniform random variables.
1: Input: , ∆, m, w, d and x
2: Compute t = 2x−w
2d(e−1)
2wd(e−1)
3: Compute probability of first component p1 = d(t+ ∆m2 )
4: Compute probability of second component p2 = dew
5: Generate uniform random variable Y in [0, 1]
6: if Y < p1 then
7: Return a uniform random variable X ′1 in [−∆m2 , t)
8: else if Y < p1 + p2 then
9: Return a uniform random variable X ′2 in [t, t+ w)
10: else
11: Return a uniform random variable X ′3 in [t+ w,
∆m
2 ]
12: end if
It takes two uniform random variables to generate one
from the Podium distribution with the additional burden of
computing the location of the step. In that sense it is similar
to the Laplace mechanism which also requires generating
two uniform random variables. The Staircase mechanism re-
quires generation of three uniform and one Geometric random
variables and, therefore, is a bit more expensive from the
computational point of view.
V. PRIVACY OF THE PODIUM MECHANISM
Theorem 1: (Privacy of the Podium mechanism.) The
Podium mechanism P provides -differential privacy, satis-
fying
e− ≤ P (P(xi) = x
′)
P (P(xj) = x′) ≤ e
,
∀xi, xj ∈
[
−∆
2
,
∆
2
]
and ∀x′ ∈
[
−∆m
2
,
∆m
2
]
.
Proof. The Podium distribution has only two “levels” which
remain the same under the step location shift, d and de. Be-
cause all shapes have the same support on [−∆m2 , ∆m2 ] (critical
for using truncated distributions for differential privacy), the
ratio of two Podium densities at any point x′ can only take
one of three discrete values {e−, 1, e}, trivially satisfying the
differential privacy condition.
VI. EFFICIENCY IMPLICATIONS OF THE PODIUM
MECHANISM
The truncated nature of the Podium mechanism carries with
it a promise of significant reductions in noise variance, as
well as a reasonable matching of input and output ranges.
In this section, we will study the efficiency implications of
the Podium mechanism relative to the Laplace and Staircase
mechanisms and how our privacy budget  impacts this com-
parison.
It is well-known that the variance of the Laplace mechanism
is equal to
VLM =
2∆2
2
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 14, NO. 8, AUGUST 2015 7
TABLE I
SHAPE OF THE PODIUM DISTRIBUTION FOR DIFFERENT LEVELS OF . m AND s DESCRIBE THE SUPPORT OF THE DISTRIBUTION AND THE STEP LOCATION
FOR THE EXTREME VALUE OF ∆/2. BOTH OF THESE PARAMETERS ARE AGNOSTIC TO THE SENSITIVITY ∆ AND THIS TABLE IS INTENDED TO BE USED AS
A LOOKUP TABLE FOR PRACTITIONERS.
 e d∆ w/∆ m s
0.10 1.11 0.02375722471160222893 19.75717223979187053828 40.01457875697349919619 0.02500390381028369871
0.20 1.22 0.04506345987206581555 9.76409708918936658506 20.02913011881816629511 0.05003117209082890565
0.30 1.35 0.06398299908230502264 6.43742941938802015756 13.37696033700935061006 0.07510487916229519056
0.40 1.49 0.08059597389586252436 4.77715888034102764692 10.05804294756504191355 0.10024752738247424966
0.50 1.65 0.09499703400539045994 3.78327667142766088659 8.07235239209783017600 0.12548078156807165873
0.60 1.82 0.10729364931374071879 3.12244228574487081573 6.75319761461645295952 0.15082522671169806827
0.70 2.01 0.11760411588256065862 2.65179308365934440772 5.81484134219294634960 0.17630015488348824149
0.80 2.23 0.12605535789473551467 2.29989669513741601392 5.11440504476727486605 0.20192338579646795793
0.90 2.46 0.13278062132156395747 2.02706847359025621458 4.57250401538532358359 0.22771112397135537253
1.00 2.72 0.13791715224609613077 1.80949844710906559975 4.14150145821963633352 0.25367785386777708112
1.10 3.00 0.14160394461977282576 1.63203625415323982928 3.79107855406700666734 0.27983627285483475555
1.20 3.32 0.14397962987907222954 1.48458356147592351881 3.50101949459931516273 0.30619726055741275372
1.30 3.67 0.14518056578734969686 1.36015146561812905190 3.25732648402148594613 0.33276988199631141185
1.40 4.06 0.14533916557731904606 1.25375038066715238649 3.04999970991564461897 0.35956142107653227269
1.50 4.48 0.14458249229495345745 1.16172391549936193655 2.87170528657359236391 0.38657744038148050825
1.60 4.95 0.14303112827925887340 1.08133249384822471839 2.71694267488028451396 0.41382186289344996544
1.70 5.47 0.14079831673952861171 1.01048388219406870547 2.58150590665574064531 0.44129707115836358522
1.80 6.05 0.13798936187917987262 0.94755349610280403816 2.46212435314669209063 0.46900401951014586421
1.90 6.69 0.13470126613922986381 0.89126141102872113997 2.35621688862633771322 0.49694235522618224188
2.00 7.39 0.13102257783244736222 0.84058623385837027975 2.26171976103008898207 0.52511054485739727671
2.10 8.17 0.12703341947401880496 0.79470355143716819857 2.17696360187561177568 0.55350600242391845285
2.20 9.03 0.12280566613877162696 0.75294113941030660353 2.10058394222743416435 0.58212521665388217151
2.30 9.97 0.11840324378870004107 0.71474583367177635385 2.03145503966341367530 0.61096387493841830540
2.40 11.02 0.11388251931172779785 0.67965866595710588971 1.96864021989918747124 0.64001698215643065826
2.50 12.18 0.10929275661468827729 0.64729595254536842486 1.91135411174901803655 0.66927897297112914909
2.60 13.46 0.10467661619026887021 0.61733473598538712857 1.85893357611533160956 0.69874381660483453338
2.70 14.88 0.10007067885799257601 0.58950145368385342692 1.81081507761900351028 0.72840511345289526979
2.80 16.44 0.09550597765329026101 0.56356302875585173595 1.76651689064763894876 0.75825618319918530741
2.90 18.17 0.09100852495427223798 0.53931980029056414416 1.72562497511496659719 0.78829014434526645250
3.00 20.09 0.08659982479172298464 0.51659986540603108907 1.68778166765538339966 0.81849998526577072422
3.10 22.20 0.08229736282512983836 0.49525451562537803341 1.65267655426602111390 0.84887862705821359732
3.20 24.53 0.07811506866045020425 0.47515452929000145943 1.62003904873315507373 0.87941897857141626549
3.30 27.11 0.07406374703275893367 0.45618713932285759327 1.58963231632417123507 0.91011398407844601444
3.40 29.96 0.07015147589510412063 0.43825353801812799714 1.56124826689564999427 0.94095666411290956876
3.50 33.12 0.06638397067108628424 0.42126681201617471872 1.53470340447300190867 0.97194015001666878018
3.60 36.60 0.06276491487627895716 0.40515022424776547805 1.50983536754540792479 1.00305771275730482017
3.70 40.45 0.05929625802852114130 0.38983577752276415973 1.48650003004058661737 1.03430278656908458679
3.80 44.70 0.05597848228507622259 0.37526300810441270972 1.46456906021545796293 1.06566898795539999334
3.90 49.40 0.05281083959950350071 0.36137796813381267702 1.44392785568767112458 1.09715013056671284453
4.00 54.60 0.04979156141368480670 0.34813236393515012423 1.42447378910962707543 1.12874023643847420928
4.10 60.34 0.04691804301811896422 0.33548282361478021230 1.40611471169982427121 1.16043354404037835081
4.20 66.69 0.04418700474995379546 0.32339027239032458461 1.38876767184400917721 1.19222451355328207256
4.30 73.70 0.04159463217325259921 0.31181939806475167387 1.37235781389144984033 1.22410782975446985610
4.40 81.45 0.03913669731626501225 0.30073819223159270475 1.35681742857288045734 1.25607840285664829061
4.50 90.02 0.03680866293950425111 0.29011755533971483878 1.34208513151364972060 1.28813136761180269119
4.60 99.48 0.03460577168702873296 0.27993095579550064667 1.32810515038040310998 1.32026208095839936441
4.70 109.95 0.03252312183997883160 0.27015413494111412129 1.31482670449056504580 1.35246611845967112941
4.80 121.51 0.03055573125265970136 0.26076485110020325431 1.30220346339166437311 1.38473926975208483370
4.90 134.29 0.02869859091219789313 0.25174265698928638413 1.29019307310674347100 1.41707753319671447834
5.00 148.41 0.02694670942662297577 0.24306870570295621703 1.27875674054004884184 1.44947710990206712900
6.00 403.43 0.01418723139383018007 0.17219582185788800954 1.18935914422996535933 1.77614064706940744109
7.00 1096.63 0.00737363899761593004 0.12274828254874604883 1.13115919550789789660 2.10599524218860123526
8.00 2980.96 0.00380868503446459743 0.08774146920938742655 1.09191760705608231774 2.43752808033378709496
9.00 8103.08 0.00196134463605011390 0.06279735139835515567 1.06489033980538949642 2.76993318274100053245
10.00 22026.47 0.00100851467979386862 0.04497117971886768067 1.04602722759397326335 3.10278893572861802497
which sets the baseline for our comparisons.
The variance of the Staircase mechanism is given by
VSM =
∆2(2−2/3e−2/3(1 + e−)2/3 + e−)
(1− e−)2 .
The variance considerations of the Podium mechanism are
a little more involved, as its variance varies depending on its
mean µ. It has the smallest variance when µ = 0 (the Podium
distribution is symmetric) and this variance is given by
V µ=0PM =
d
12
(
∆3m3 + w3(e − 1))
=
∆2m2
12
(1 + e−s)(1 + es)
1 + es + e + e−s
=
∆2
12
(1 + es + e + e−s)(1 + e−s)(1 + es)
(e − 1)2 .
The Podium mechanism takes on the largest variance in case
of the most off-center location of the step, i.e. when a large
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Fig. 5. Variance comparison between the Podium (both exact and approximate), Staircase and Laplace mechanisms for different levels of  ∈
{0.5, log(3), 5, 10}. The Podium mechanism has smaller variance in all privacy regimes and outperforms the other two in the most critical high to medium
privacy scenarios (small ).
portion of the mass is in one of the tails (its mean is equal to
−∆2 or ∆2 . Here, the variance is equal to
V
µ=∆/2
PM =
∆2m2
12
× 1
1 + es + e + e−s
×3 + e
−s + es(es + 3e)
1 + es
− ∆
2
4
=
∆2
12
cosh(2s− ) + 4 cosh(s) + 3
cosh()− 1 .
Its variance is somewhere in between these two values for
any intermediate shape of the distribution.
In Figure 5 we compare variances of the three mechanisms
for four different values of . We also consider the EXACT
and APPROXIMATE versions of the Podium mechanism. The
following observations are worth noting:
• The Podium mechanism is more efficient than the other
two in all privacy regimes. It is especially pronounced
for the commonly used  = log(3) where its variance is
essentially halved.
• The two versions of the Podium mechanism are virtually
indistinguishable in terms of efficiency.
• The variance of the Podium mechanism is smallest at 0
and is monotonically increasing towards the extremes.
• The Laplace and Staircase mechanisms are asymptoti-
cally equivalent in the high-privacy regime (→ 0).
• The Podium and Staircase mechanisms are asymptotically
equivalent in the low-privacy regime (→∞).
To study the optimality implications of the Podium mech-
anism, we will make use of the fact that s = /3 is a good
approximation for the optimal s to make this a more tractable
exercise.
In the high privacy regime ( → 0), the step width w is
equal to ∆m, i.e, the Podium distribution becomes equivalent
to the uniform distribution on the interval [−∆m2 , ∆m2 ]. Thus,
its variance (it is also apparent by plugging  = 0 into V µ=0PM
or V µ=∆/2PM ) is equal to
V =0PM =
∆2m2
12
,
which is exactly what we would want for perfect privacy.
Theorem 2: (High Privacy Regime). In the high privacy
regime ( → 0), the variance of the Podium mechanism is
equal to
V →0PM = Θ
(
4
3
∆2
2
)
.
Proof. Since
m→0 =
1 + es + e + e−s
e − 1 = Θ
(
4

)
the result immediately follows.
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The Podium mechanism is 33% more efficient at the ex-
treme high privacy regime relative to either the Laplace or
Staircase mechanisms
e→0(PM,LM) =
VPM
VLM
= Θ
(
4
3
∆2
2
2∆
2
2
)
= Θ
(
2
3
)
.
In the low privacy regime (→∞), the Podium mechanism
is asymptotically equivalent to the Staircase mechanism and
exponentially outperforms the Laplace mechanism.
Theorem 3: (Low Privacy Regime). In the low privacy
regime,  → ∞, the variance of the Podium mechanism in
the extreme right shape is equal to
V →∞PM = Θ
(
∆2e−
2
3
)
.
Proof. In case when s = /3,
V →∞PM =
∆2
12
cosh(− 3 ) + 4 cosh( 3 ) + 3
cosh()− 1
=
∆2
12
5 cosh( 3 ) + 3
cosh()− 1
= Θ
(
∆2 cosh( 3 )
cosh()
)
= Θ
(
∆2e
2
3 e
e

3 e2
)
= Θ
(
∆2e−
2
3
)
.
The Podium mechanism is exponentially more efficient than
the Laplace mechanism in the low privacy regime.
e→∞(PM,LM) =
VPM
VLM
= Θ
(
∆2e−
2
3
2∆2
2
)
= Θ
(
e−
2
3
)
and is asymptotically equivalent to the Staircase mechanism.
Relative efficiencies for the three mechanisms are directly
compared in Table VI. The Podium mechanism outperforms
the other two mechanisms and its approximation of s = /3
is shown to be a very good one for all levels of .
VII. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND COMPARISONS
We simulated our raw input values from the Beta(2, 2)
distribution [11]. This distribution is symmetric around its
mean 0.5 with the support in [0, 1]. Therefore, ∆ in this case is
equal to 1. We shift our distribution to the left by 0.5 to center
it around 0. The range of input values after this transformation
is [−0.5, 0.5].
We simulated 10,000 random variables from the Beta
distribution (raw input x) and added noise using the three
randomized mechanisms discussed in this work: the Laplace,
Staircase and Podium. Results of our simulations are shown
in Figure 6, which has six panels. The two rows represent
different levels of privacy. The first row can be considered a
high-privacy regime ( = 1) and the second row is a relatively
low privacy regime ( = 5). The three columns represent the
three different mechanisms.
In each panel, we plot the raw input x on the x-axis
versus the noisy privatized versions of x, x′, on the y-axis.
TABLE II
RELATIVE EFFICIENCIES OF THE THREE MECHANISMS FOR DIFFERENT
LEVELS OF . THE SECOND COLUMN COMPARES THE APPROXIMATE VS
EXACT ESTIMATION OF s (PM3 STANDS FOR THE APPROXIMATE PODIUM
MECHANISM). THE THIRD COLUMN COMPARES VARIANCES OF THE
PODIUM MECHANISM AT µ = 0 VS µ = ∆
2
. THE FOURTH AND FIFTH
COLUMNS COMPARE THE PODIUM AND THE STAIRCASE MECHANISMS VS
THE LAPLACE. AND THE LAST TWO COLUMNS COMPARE THE PODIUM
MECHANISM VS THE STAIRCASE MECHANISM AT µ = 0 AND µ = ∆
2
.
 PM3
PM
PM0
PM∆/2
PM
LM
SV
LM
MP0
SM
MP
SM
0.10 1.0000 0.9639 0.6663 0.9996 0.6425 0.6666
0.20 1.0001 0.9304 0.6653 0.9983 0.6200 0.6664
0.30 1.0003 0.8993 0.6635 0.9963 0.5990 0.6661
0.40 1.0006 0.8705 0.6611 0.9933 0.5794 0.6656
0.50 1.0009 0.8438 0.6581 0.9896 0.5611 0.6650
0.60 1.0012 0.8191 0.6543 0.9851 0.5441 0.6642
0.70 1.0017 0.7962 0.6500 0.9798 0.5282 0.6634
0.80 1.0022 0.7749 0.6450 0.9736 0.5133 0.6624
0.90 1.0027 0.7553 0.6394 0.9667 0.4995 0.6614
1 1.0033 0.7370 0.6332 0.9590 0.4866 0.6603
log(3) 1.0039 0.7204 0.6266 0.9508 0.4748 0.6590
log(16) 1.0186 0.5662 0.4603 0.7251 0.3594 0.6348
log(32) 1.0247 0.5409 0.3813 0.6082 0.3391 0.6270
5 1.0352 0.5143 0.2296 0.3714 0.3180 0.6183
10 1.0475 0.5005 0.0264 0.0424 0.3123 0.6239
20 1.0498 0.5000 0.0001 0.0002 0.3149 0.6297
30 1.0499 0.5000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3150 0.6300
40 1.0500 0.5000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3150 0.6299
50 1.0417 0.4977 0.0000 0.0000 0.3153 0.6335
In addition, we compute the variance of the noisy x′s in
each panel for comparison. In a case one was interested in
estimating the mean of µ = E(X) using the sample mean x¯′,
then the estimate of its variance would be equal to
V (x¯′) =
V (x′)
10000
.
Therefore, the scaled variances shown in each panel also
indicate how variable our estimate of µ would be in each
case. Note that these are not noise variances, but the sum of
variance of X plus the noise variance.
There are three important takeaways from this visualization:
• The Podium mechanism outperforms the other two mech-
anisms in terms of efficiency. In fact, for  = 1, it reduces
the variance of the privatized values by approximately
half, even relative to the Staircase mechanism.
• For the Podium mechanism, it is easy to notice how
truncation is contributing to the variance reduction. Its
noise is distributed differently for different levels of x.
At the extremes, the noise appears to be one-sided, which
of course is not true because of the margin m.
• The Laplace mechanism is quite inefficient both in the
low and medium privacy regimes.
The Podium mechanism results in smaller variance for the
privatized distribution, and, therefore, smaller variance when
estimating the mean or other measures of central tendency.
It is important to make the following observation from
Figure 6. In the previous section, we have shown that the
Podium and Staircase mechanisms are exponentially better
than the Laplace mechanism in terms of efficiency as →∞.
Yet already at  = 5, variances of the samples collected are
much closer together than variances of samples collect when
 = 1, which seems counter-intuitive at first. This, of course, is
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Fig. 6. We compare the three mechanisms (in columns) for a high-privacy (first row) and medium-privacy (bottom row) regimes in terms of their efficiency.
The raw input data {x1, . . . , x10000} is plotted on the x-axis vs the privatized, noisy versions {x′1, . . . , x′10000} on the y-axis. Variances of the collected
privatized data is shown in each panel. The Podium mechanism has significantly smaller variance than either the Laplace or Staircase mechanisms in both
high- and medium-privacy regime. It is also very clearly characterized by this “box” appearance as a result of its truncated nature.
very easily explainable upon further examination. The variance
of samples collected is the sum of variance of the original X
and the variance added by the randomized mechanism M.
For  = 1, these variances are comparable in magnitude and,
therefore, it matters a lot which mechanism one chooses. But
for  = 5, the variance of the randomized algorithm is so
much smaller than the variance of X , that despite significant
differences in their efficiency levels, the resulting variances
of X ′ under different mechanisms are quite close. As  gets
even bigger, these variances essentially converge to the value
of V (X), regardless of which mechanism one chooses. So,
in practice, the exponential efficiency benefits of the Podium
and Staircase mechanisms in low-privacy regimes matter little
beyond theoretical curiosities.
VIII. DISCUSSION
We presented a novel randomized algorithm, called the
Podium mechanism, for achieving -differential privacy. It
is characterized by the changing shape of its distribution
depending on the input value x and its truncated nature. This
is the first time that such truncated distribution was proposed
for achieving -differential privacy.
The Podium mechanism is strictly better than either the
Laplace or Staircase mechanisms and can be used in all places
where the Laplace mechanism is currently being used, despite
its optimality claims in a more narrow sense [12], [13]. Just
like the Laplace mechanism, it requires generation of two
uniform random variables, but has the additional burden of
computing t, the location of the step, at each noise addition.
At this time, there is a plethora of literature on differential
privacy in more complex settings [14], [15], [16], [17], [18],
[19], [20], [21], [22], [23], [24] where this work could be
applicable or extended.
The benefits of the Podium mechanism really come through
at the medium privacy regime ( ∈ [1, 3]). It has the smallest
noise variance for values close to middle of the input range,
making it necessary for practitioners to consider the shape of
their input distribution. The more symmetric and centered it
is, the more efficient the collection will be.
We hope that a slight additional complexity of generating
random variables from the Podium distribution will not deter
its practical adoption. After all, we all strive for more utility
out of our data.
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